Record number of audit failures during the recent past has prompted much debate about whether high auditor compensation, especially for nonaudit work, may have led to lax auditing standards.
Introduction
The recent collapse of the stock market has been accompanied by large-scale audit failures. which adopts amendments to its existing requirements in an effort to enhance the independence of the accountants. The amendment has three major changes to the existing rules. First, it increases the disclosure categories of professional fees paid for audit and nonaudit services from three to four: audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and all other fees. Second, the new disclosure would require firms to report fees for each of the two most recent fiscal years. Third, the definition of audit fee has expanded to not only include services necessary to perform an audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) but also may include services that generally only the independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and assistance with and review of documents filed with the Commission.
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Although the SEC has enacted legislation assuming consulting assignments impair auditor independence, the evidence is mixed. On one hand it is argued that there are economies of scale and scope that permit the auditors to perform important consulting assignments in a cost-effective manner. Also, auditors compete on the basis of reputation, which is only acquired by a history of credible auditing. Compromising audit quality, especially when it allows a company to present rosy results, jeopardizes the auditor's reputation. A second important reason for auditors to value credible and independent audit is the threat of litigation. The liability at both the federal and state levels and requirements of various government agencies with threat of expensive litigation for failure (and potential criminal sanctions) provide strong incentives for auditors to remain 2 See SEC issue "Final Rule: Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence" 2/6/2003. 3 How clearly and what the SEC defines as audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and all other fees has become a contentious issue as far as how informative the required disclosures will be to the market. See The Wall Street Journal, independent and vigilant. 4 On the other hand, it has been argued that the independence of an audit is compromised when the auditor believes large consulting fees may be at stake.
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This study attempts to empirically examine the relationship between an audit failure alleged in a securities class action lawsuit and the various elements of auditor compensation. We find that for our sample of 100 firms in which audit failure has been alleged in a securities class action lawsuit, the audit fees, as well as nonaudit fees are no higher than for a matched sample. 6 However for our sample of firms with the largest market reaction to the audit failure during the period over which the alleged fraud occurred (the "class period"), the nonaudit fees was higher than comparable firms. This difference persists even after controlling for known determinants of auditor compensation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the extant theoretical and empirical evidence on auditor independence. Section 3 describes our sample selection process and reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Section 4 presents evidence on the differences in auditor compensation between our sample firms and the matched sample.
Section 5 concludes.
Auditor Independence

Importance of Auditor Independence
"Proposal May Blur `Audit Fees' ---Plan by the SEC to Tweak Disclosure Rules Could Aid Big U.S. Accounting Firms," January 23, 2002. 4 See e.g. DeAngelo (1981) , Watts and Zimmerman (1983) , Goldman & Barley (1974) , Craswell et al. (2002) 5 See Simunic 1984 , Parkash and Venable 1993 , Firth 1997 Our matching algorithm required that each matched firm have total assets within 90% and 110% of the total assets of the litigated firm and have the same SIC code (either 4,3,2, or 1-digit code). Then, we chose the firm with the closest fiscal year end to the litigated sample. Alternatively, we could have chosen our sample of matched firms based on the same SIC code and then matched on total revenue. Previous research shows that size is by far the biggest determinant of audit fees. Therefore we chose to first match on total assets (within a confidence interval) in an effort to hold constant the effect of firm size.
For capital markets to function well, it is essential that investors are able to get a scorecard on how companies are performing. The scorecard is presented in the form of financial statements that are standardized across companies and follow certain guidelines. The only way in which financial statements are useful to investors is when they are credible. Auditors play an important role in ensuring that accounting statements follow the generally accepted guidelines and are accurate. Expectation is that auditors are independent and will detect and reveal any material omissions or misstatements in the financial statements.
That auditors are perceived to be independence is also important to auditors. Auditors can attain credibility with market participants by bonding enough wealth to make dishonest behavior improbable. 7 One important bonding source is the auditor's reputation, which makes the audit credible for investors. Auditors compete on the basis of reputation, which is only acquired by a history of credible auditing. Compromising audit quality, especially when it allows a company to present rosy results, jeopardizes the auditor's reputation. Over time investors will respond to systematic "bad" auditing by discounting the value of the audit and companies with little to hide will be forced to change auditors. A second important source for auditor bonding is the threat of litigation. The liability at both the federal and state levels and requirements of various government agencies with threat of expensive litigation for failure (and potential criminal sanctions) also provide incentives for auditors to remain independent and vigilant. Given the spate of high-profile audit failures recently, the market, the press, the regulators, and the Congress have all questioned whether the mix of policy and legal mechanisms have been effective in ensuring auditor independence.
Compensation and Auditor Independence
7 Leland and Pyle (1977) , Campbell & Kracaw (1980) The debate in the academic literature on the effects of the various components of auditor's compensation on auditor independence has produced mixed results. Some arguments in the literature support the notion of a positive association between auditor independence and compensation. On the other hand, economic dependence of the audit firm on a client may also increase the likelihood that the auditor will acquiesce to management's requests leading to lower quality financial statements.
For example, Simunic (1984) models the joint demand for both audit and nonaudit services.
He demonstrates that when the auditor provides both services a cost savings (due to "knowledge spillovers") from the joint supply of these services occurs. As a result, when the same auditor provides both services, the cost savings may benefit the accounting firm. The auditor, now earning rents, faces a higher marginal expected loss from being dismissed by top management producing a greater incentive for the auditor to conceal bad news or comply with management.
Another view in this literature holds that providing consulting services does not hinder auditor independence and in some cases may enhance auditors' incentives to stay independent.
DeAngelo (1981) concedes that increased revenues generated by auditors from consulting fees may create an incentive for auditors to compromise their independence and report favorably in order to retain clients. However, when auditors have more than one client there is less financial dependence on a single client. Reputational penalties constrain the behavior of audit firms because the gains from acquiescing to any one client's demands are outweighed by the reputational losses that would be imposed by other clients who need and value the audit firms with a reputation for independence.
Similarly, Goldman and Barlev (1974) argue that consulting services combined with auditing services may create a situation in which the client's dependence on the auditor increases because these services enhance the auditor's uniqueness and thus the value to the client.
In Table 1 we summarize the empirical research that examines the association between auditor independence (and/or financial reporting quality, audit quality) and economic dependence.
Since neither auditor independence nor economic dependence is observable, researchers have used several different variables to proxy for these variables. Table 1 displays over seven different measures used by researchers to gauge the extent of the auditor's dependence on the client.
Depending on the proxy, the results of these studies have led to conflicting conclusions. Craswell et al. (2002) uses the auditor's propensity to qualify the audit as a measure of auditor independence. For a sample of Australian firms they find that fee dependence does not affect the auditors propensity to qualify their audit opinion (both at the national market level and the local market level). Francis and Reynolds (2001) test the hypothesis that fee dependence will cause auditors to be more lenient and give clients greater discretion in accounting for accruals (both discretionary and total accruals). Surprisingly, they find a negative association between fee dependence and the level of accruals and suggest that reputation protection and litigation avoidance are sufficient incentives for auditors to maintain objectivity. They also find that larger clients (for whom auditors presumably have greater fee dependence) are more likely to receive a going concern audit report. Similarly, DeFond et al. (2002) analyzed financially distressed firms and found no association between audit fees and the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion.
Some studies have shown a positive association between measures of economic dependence and auditor independence (audit quality). Firth (1997) and Parkash and Venable (1993) show that high agency cost firms (determined by lower levels of management ownership, lower outside investment concentration and higher debt) recognize the potential for perceptions of independence impairment and voluntarily limit ex ante purchases of consulting services from the auditors. Their results suggest that auditees recognize the potential for perceptions of independence impairment and higher agency cost firms voluntarily limit the purchase of nonaudit service. Frankel et al. (2001) use the level of discretionary accruals and the ability of the firm to just meet or beat earnings targets as a proxy for financial reporting quality. They show a positive association between two measures of nonaudit services and earnings quality.
Auditor Independence in the Enron Case
The Enron audit failure has highlighted the importance of auditor compensation and independence in a very dramatic manner and captured the attention of the market, the press, policymakers and the US Congress alike. It is widely believed that Arthur Andersen's independence was impaired in the Enron case.
It has also been alleged that Arthur Andersen purposely or naively overlooked the accounting for special purpose entities. The fact that Andersen destroyed documents and eventually was found guilty of obstruction of justice is especially troubling.
Sample Selection and Description
Audit Failure as a Proxy for Auditor Independence
The consumers of financial statements expect that an audit would detect and reveal any misstatements of financial information. In some instances, when the audit fails to detect any error in the financial statements and the consumers of that information incur losses, they pursue legal action against auditors and management of the firm. We identify instances in which the consumers of audits (investors) initiate legal action as a consequence of alleged accounting improprieties.
These instances are our proxy of audit failure. 8 A caveat about our proxy is in order. Litigation against firms for alleged accounting violation helps us to identify firms for which lack of auditor independence has been alleged, not proven. Some of these securities class action lawsuits are dismissed, and most are settled. 
Sample
On November 15, 2000 the SEC adopted revised auditor independence rules requiring firms to separately disclose the amount of audit fees, nonaudit fees and systems design and implementation fees billed by the auditor for the most recent year. 10 Such disclosure permits us to collect auditor compensation data for our sample from firms' annual proxy statements.
Our sample begins with the universe of firms that where the subject of a class action lawsuit filed during 2001 or 2002. We identified such firms through the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse Database. We found 691 such complaints. The sample is further restricted to those firms with data on the amount of audit and nonaudit fees available in the proxy statements. We further restrict the sample by excluding 14 financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) because the relationship between accounting numbers (specifically total assets) and the level of fees paid to a firms auditor may be very different for financial firms as opposed to those included in the sample.
Additionally, we limit our sample to those firms that had litigation in connection with an accounting violation. Next, we require the firms to have data on audit fees and nonaudit fees in the proxy statements that overlap the alleged "class period" or the financial statements in question. 11 We also require our sample firms to have a matched firm, based on industry and total assets (discussed later). This selection process resulted in 100 firms. We obtain data on firm characteristics from
Compustat and data on firms' acquisition activity from SDC.
Panel A of Table 2 In order to determine whether audit and/or nonaudit fees are higher than expected for firms for which there is an alleged accounting allegation, we construct a matched sample based on SIC code and size of the firms as measured by its total assets. For each firm in the litigation sample, a matched firm was obtained by first identifying all firms in Compustat with an identical SIC code.
Out of these firms with a matched SIC code, we select the firm with total assets (measured at the 11 Of our sample of litigation firms, 7 did not have fee data overlapping the class period.
fiscal year end overlapping the litigated firm's class period) closest in size to the total assets of our litigated firm to be included in our matched sample. However, we require the total assets of the matched firm to be within 90% and 110% of the total assets of the litigated firm and the firm must have the required audit fee data available in its proxy. If no firm is within this size interval, we repeat the process but increase the sample of potential matches by identify all firms with a similar three-digit SIC. If this does not produce a match we identify firms with a similar two digit SIC code, then, if necessary, by one digit SIC code. Out of our sample of 103 litigated firms that otherwise passed our selection criteria, we could identify 100 firms with a matched firm (our selection process did not identify a match for three of our litigated firms). Our matched sample consists of 33, 20, 31 and 16 firms that were match by 4, 3, 2, and 1 digit SIC, respectively.
In Table 3 we present descriptive statistics for our sample on certain variables of interest and Table 3 presents the frequency by industry. The most represented industry is computers, 23%, and next is durable manufacturers at 22% of the sample. Overall the results in Table 3 indicate that the litigated and matched sample are similar. Given this similarity, we would also expect the amount of audit and nonaudit fees billed by the firm's auditor to be similar between the two samples. Table 4 reports the results of t-tests for differences in means (medians) in auditor compensation between firms that had an alleged accounting failure and a matched sample of similar sized firms in the same industry. To study whether results could be different for larger versus smaller firms, we sort our samples into three subsamples based on the value of total assets at yearend, corresponding to the sample year-end for which the audit fee data was collected. Subsample 1 contains the smallest firms and Subsample 3 contains the largest firms. The asset size of the smallest group is 137 million and the largest group is 30,599 million.
Audit Failure and Auditor Compensation
Difference in Auditor Compensation for Litigated Firms
Consistent with the findings that larger firms require more audit services, we observe that both the mean and median audit fees monotonically increases with size. Indeed, the largest asset size category for the litigated firms has a mean of 3.34 million in total audit fees which is about fifteen times larger than the average audit fees for the smallest firms. A similar pattern holds when we compare nonaudit and total fees. Furthermore, the influence of size on audit and nonaudit fees is also observed in the matched sample. Overall, for the sample of litigated firms, the mean (median) total auditor compensation is 5.3 (1.3) million.
Panel A shows that the average audit fees are a little higher for the litigated firms than in the matched sample for all but the smallest firms, however the difference is not statistically significant.
In fact, mean (median) total audit compensation between the samples is quite similar, 1.36 (.40) million for the litigation sample and 1.31 (.51) million for the matched sample. The remaining four panels reveal that the mean and median for nonaudit fees, total fees, nonaudit fees as a fraction of total fees and as a fraction of audit fees, respectively, is somewhat higher for the firms involved in litigation, but the difference is not statistically significant. The results do not provide support for the hypothesis that firms involved in an accounting impropriety had relatively higher audit compensation. Table 5 reports means and medians of audit and nonaudit fees by industries for which there are at least 10 firms represented by the sample (Computers, Durable Manufacturers, Services, Utilities). Panels B and C report total fees by industry and show that only the utility industry has higher nonaudit fees and total fees that are weakly significant at a 10% level. However, for the other three industries the fee (audit, nonaudit and total) differences are statistically insignificant.
Since only the utilities industry shows a weakly significant difference across the two samples, the results provide little support for the hypothesis that the fees paid to a firm's auditor impair auditor independence or effectiveness.
In Table 6 However, not all restatements necessarily represent serious misstatements. GAAP do not always provide a uniquely correct answer on accounting treatment, nor would a rigid system of rules be always consistent with the objectives underlying GAAP. As the importance of intangibles and complexity of businesses grows, the scope for ambiguities in GAAP grows as well. Moreover, after high-profile audit failures in the Enron and other cases, auditors and firms may well be restating results in an effort to be more conservative in the current environment. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that all restatements represent significant audit failures. In an attempt to quantify the severity of the audit failure we calculated change in value of the firm's common equity from the day with the highest stock price in the class period to the day after the class period. Firms with the greatest decline in stock price are assumed to represent the most severe audit failures in market's judgment.
Severity of the Alleged Audit Failure
Our sample of litigation firms are those in which audit failure has been alleged, not proven.
In fact, many shareholder class actions are dismissed by courts before any violation is proven.
12 Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges, Almost all of the rest are settled out of court. Clearly, class action lawsuits are filed in many cases even when no audit failure has occurred. To improve the signal to noise ratio for our proxy, we sort our sample of litigation firms based on the magnitude of the stock price decline between the highest stock price during the class period and the end of the class period (which is usually when "corrective disclosure" is made). The interpretation of our proxy for "audit failure" could be confounded by the issue that class action laws may provide incentives to sue firms with negative abnormal returns preceding the class period 13 . It may be the case that a large decline in stock price leads to the initiation of a lawsuit. However, given this possible limitation, we believe our proxy does do a good job capturing the most severe audit failures in market's judgment. Table 7 reports the results for a third of our firms with the largest decline in market value, (1984) nonaudit fees to total fees for the least severe audit failure are statistically significant at a 10% level but in the direction opposite to that suggested by the fee dependence argument.
Multivariate Analysis
In the appendix to this paper, we develop a model to explain the cross-sectional differences in for the natural log of total fees, audit fees, nonaudit fees and two ratio measures of consulting fees: the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees and the ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees. Several determinants of fees paid to a firm's auditor have been well documented in the academic literature.
Our model has similar explanatory power to other fee structure models used the prior literature 14 .
Our results are similar whether we use the litigation, matched or combined sample. 15 The appendix provides details on the empirical estimation and results of the model. firms involved in an audit failure paid relatively higher compensation to their auditors. We also include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm restated earnings. The log of total assets, the ratio of foreign income taxes to total sales and return on assets all significantly explain the level of audit fees. However, our results indicate that, after controlling for other factors that may explain fees, the difference in fees between the litigation sample and the matched sample are not statistically different. Our variable of interest, the indicator variable for the litigation sample, is not significant at explaining the level of audit, nonaudit, total fees or the ratio of consulting fees: the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees and the ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees.
14 See for example : Craswell et al. (1995) , Seetharaman et al. (2002 ), Firth (1997 , Parkash and Venable (1993) 15 See Appendix, Tables A-1, A-2 & A-3 The results from with all other correlations less than + .05. Table 9 presents the results of the same cross-sectional regressions presented in Table 8, but we limit the sample to the third of our firms with the largest decline in market value. Our results indicate that for these firms with the most severe audit failures, the three measures of nonaudit fees The results (not presented) for the middle third and the least severe audit failures show no significant difference between the two samples 16 . Taken together, the results from Table 9 are consistent with the hypothesis the auditor's independence may be compromised in their bid to attract consulting business from their auditing clients. However, given the small size of our subsample (66 firms) we can not make a conclusive argument.
Summary and Implications
Record number of audit failures during the recent past has prompted much debate in the popular press, policy circles and in the US Congress about whether high auditor compensation, especially for nonaudit work, may have led to lax auditing standards. We shed light on this question by comparing auditor compensation for a set of firms in which accounting improprieties were alleged in a shareholder class action lawsuit with a set of matched firms in the same industry and of similar size. Our evidence suggests that auditors were not compensated differently for either their audit or consulting services over the period in which their client was allegedly involved in an accounting fraud. However, for the set of firms with the largest market reaction to the alleged fraud, the nonaudit component of the total fees was significantly higher then comparable firms even after controlling for other known determinants of auditor compensation.
While our analysis documents that nonaudit fees are indeed higher than normal in cases for which there was a severe audit failure, this result should be interpreted with caution. There may be perfectly valid business reasons for companies to use the auditors for consulting activities more than similar sized firms in the same industry. Therefore, higher compensation for consulting activities cannot be interpreted as evidence of lack of auditor independence. Any allegation of auditor integrity being compromised can only be made based on analysis of facts and circumstances. * indicates significant differences between our sample and the matched sample at a 10% level. ** indicates significant differences between our sample and the matched sample at a 5% level. 
Appendix: Determinants of Auditor Compensation
In this appendix, we develop a model to explain the cross-sectional differences in the auditors compensation, specifically, the total fees, audit fees, the nonaudit fees, the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees and the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees across firms. In particular, we use a multivariate regression approach, in which we utilize known determinants of auditor compensation as independent variables, in addition to an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in the litigation sample and to see if this variable is significant.
A. Fee Structure Model
The determinants of fees paid to a firm's auditor have been well documented in the academic literature. We rely on Craswell et al. (1995) and Seetharaman et al. (2002) to develop a model that explains the cross-sectional variation in audit fees. Similarly, we examine Firth (1997) and Parkash and Venable (1993) to develop a model that explains the cross-sectional variation in nonaudit fees. These studies provide evidence that several factors contribute to the purchase of both audit and nonaudit service including auditee size, auditor-auditee risk sharing and audit complexity.
Firm Size:
Seetharaman et al. find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that above-average litigation risk motivates the auditors to (1) increase effort in a defense against the likelihood of future litigation and/or (2) charge a premium to cover possible future litigation losses. This is consistent with the theory underlying Simunic (1980) and Simunic and Stein (1996) that audit fees reflect risk differences across liability regimes. Auditors are expected to charge a fee that covers the cost of the audit plus the expected value of possible future loses associated litigation. Large firms may represent potential "deep pockets" and be a more attractive target for litigation. Consequently, we control for auditee size by including the log of total assets. Simunic (1980) provides evidence that auditor lawsuits typically involve a problem with asset valuation, thus we use total assets to control for size instead of revenue or market value. Prior studies have shown auditee size to be statistically and economically significant at explaining cross-sectional variations in fees. We expect the coefficient on the natural log of total assets to be positive.
Audit Complexity:
Consistent with prior research, we would expect audit complexity to be positively related to the amount of audit and nonaudit fees. We control for cross sectional differences in audit complexity using the ratio of the absolute value of foreign tax to total sales and an indicator variable, which is set equal to one if the firm tried to acquire more than 50% of another firm during the sample period. We expect total audit hours to increase with the complexity of the audit, and therefore audit fees. In the same way, as audit complexity increases we expect firms to benefit more from consulting services. For example, some of the firms in our sample disclosed the type of nonaudit services provided by the auditor. Firms appear to provide different mixes of nonaudit services to clients, however tax consulting and preparation appears to be the most common. Other prominent service lines include audit related services (accounting advice), review of financial statement and mergers and acquisition consulting service. Both components of fee structure should increase as audit complexity increases, thus we predict the signs on these two variables to be positive.
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Debt Ratio:
Palmrose (1997) shows that auditor litigation often involves financial distressed clients.
Since there is evidence that audit fees are litigation risk adjusted, we predict an inverse relationship 17 The model was also estimated with alternative proxies for audit complexity: Herfindahl Index for the amount of sales in each operating segment and geographic segment, the square root of the number of operating segments for the firm, the square root of the number of acquisitions of the firm to proxy for audit complexity. These variables for audit complexity are significantly correlated with FTAX and ACQ, thus the results are consistent with those reported in Table  9 .
between audit fees and the probability of financial failure 18 . We use the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and the return on assets to proxy for cross sectional differences in financial condition. It is difficult to predict financial failure but we use excessive leverage and poor profitability to proxy for this probability 19 . Given the inverse relationship prediction, we expect the coefficient on ratio of long term debt to total assets to be negative and the coefficient on return on equity to be positive.
Similar arguments can be made for the relationship between consulting fees and the probability of financial failure.
Growth:
The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity measures the firm's future investment opportunities. The higher the ratio, the greater the value of growth opportunities.
As a result, we include this variable to control for the effect that rapidly growing firms may demand more audit and consulting services.
Auditor Reputation:
Prior research has documented that a brand name price premium exists for Big Five auditors (Francis and Simon 1988 , Francis 1984 , Francis and Stokes 1987 , Palmrose 1986 ). Therefore, we include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm employs a Big 5 auditor (Arthur Andersen, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche) and zero otherwise. We expect the coefficient on this indicator variable to be positively associated with audit fees, reflecting the fact that larger audit firms charge a premium. Similarly, since Big 5 audit firms are larger and may be more able to provide nonaudit services, we expect a positive association between the Big 5 auditor indicator variable and nonaudit fees.
Change in Auditor:
18 See Seetharaman et al. (2002) We include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm changed auditors from the previous year for two reasons. DeAngelo's (1981) low balling model predicts a differential pricing of new audit engagements. Simon and Francis (1988) find for a large sample of firms changing auditors there is evidence of a substantial audit fee discount in initial year. Second, when there has been a change in auditors during the year, fees paid to both the predecessor and successor auditor are not disclosed. The SEC rules only require the fee disclosure for the accountant who renders an audit opinion on the most recent year's financial statements. As a result, we include this variable to control for a potential "low ball" effect or the possibility that some audit fees billed by a predecessor auditor will not be disclosed. In this case, only a portion of the firm's total expenditure on audit fees for the fiscal year end will be reflected in the disclosure. As a result, we predict a negative association between this variable and both audit and nonaudit fees.
We estimate the following OLS regressions: The error term, υ, is assumed to have the normal OLS regression properties. The SEC and the popular press seem to be concerned about how the provision of nonaudit service creates incentives for the auditor to reduce independence. DeAngelo (1981) argues that audit reports may be compromised due to market power exercised by audit clients, thus high total fees may threaten auditor independence. As a result, the economic bond between the auditor and the client may be affected by not only nonaudit fees but also total fees billed by the auditor.
Therefore, we examine the audit fees (Fee 2 ) and nonaudit fees (Fee 3 ) in isolation and also total fees billed by the auditor (Fee 1 ). Because the fee data (total, audit, nonaudit fees billed) are not normally distributed, we transform them by adding one and taking their natural log.
In 1978, the SEC adopted Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 250, which required firms to disclose total nonaudit services as a percentage of total audit fees. As a result, prior research uses the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees as a measure of nonaudit services 20 . Ashbaugh et al. (2002) argue that fee levels lead to a more powerful test of independence (over ratios) because the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees does not necessarily capture the economic bond between the client and the audit firm. For example, the least amount of audit fees billed by an auditor in our sample is $46,000 and this variable is 34.8% for that firm. For this firm the ratio is reasonably high, however the total fees billed are quite low and may be economically insignificant to the audit firm. Despite its weakness as an independent variable, we still estimate the model using the fraction of nonaudit fees as a percentage of total fees (audit fees), Fee 4 (Fee 5 ) as our independent variable for sake of comparison with the prior literature.
The parameter estimates of our OLS regression results for the sample of litigation firms are reported in Table A-1. (Please provide Table A -1, which has all of the independent variables, except the litigation dummy.) Our model (with industry variables) explains 67% of Total Fees, 62% of Audit Fees, 60% of Nonaudit Fees and 21% of the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees. The relatively lower explanatory power for two models with a measure of nonaudit fee as the dependent variable, Fee 3 and Fee 4, is indicative of the fact that firms have alternatives when it comes to consulting services, they do not need to purchase nonaudit services from their auditor. Our models without industry variables have similar explanatory power to the models in Craswell et al. (1995), and Seetharaman et al. (2002) .
Consistent with prior models, we find that firms with greater total assets and lower return on assets purchase more services from their auditor (both audit and nonaudit services). In every case these relations are significant at the 5% level, except for return on assets for Model 4. The proxies for audit complexity (the ratio of the absolute value of foreign tax to total assets and an acquisition indicator variable) have the predicted sign, however they are not significant across models. Foreign tax to total sales is significantly positive for explaining audit-fees but not nonaudit fees. The acquisition indicator variable is significant at explaining the level of nonaudit service (Model 3 and 4) but not audit services. The ratio of long-term debt to total assets is negative but not significant.
The Big 5 indicator variable and the auditor change indicator variable only have the predicted sign for Model 4, however they are not significant across models. High multicolinearity between these variables and the size variable may explain the reason they do not have the predicted sign. 
